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Abstract 
This paper presents the first empirical analysis of programmes to fast-track ‘green’ patent applications 
in place in seven Intellectual Property offices around the world. We find that only a small share of 
green patent applications (between 1% and 20% depending on the patent office) request accelerated 
examination, suggesting that patent applicants have a strong incentive to keep their patent applications 
in the examination process for as long as possible. Fast-tracking programmes reduce the examination 
process by several years compared to patents going through normal examination procedure and have 
seemingly accelerated the diffusion of technological knowledge in green technologies. In addition, we 
find that applicants require accelerated examination for patents of relatively higher value and that fast-
tracking programmes seem to be particularly appealing to start-up companies in the green technology 
sector that are currently raising capital but still generate small revenue.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the past few years, promoting environmentally-friendly innovation has become a key 
priority for national and international environmental policy. "Green" innovation is envisioned 
by governments not only as an essential means to tackle environmental issues and promote 
sustainable development, but also as a potential driver of economic growth, especially in a 
time of economic downturn. Indeed, environment-related industries such as renewable energy 
generation are some of the few sectors of the economy that still experience significant 
growth.  
Against this background, a number of national intellectual property offices around the 
world have recently put in place measures to fast track ‘green’ patent applications. These 
include Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, the UK, and the US
1
. More recently, the 
Brazilian National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) and China's State Intellectual 
Property Office (SIPO) have launched similar programmes
2
. The common objective of these 
schemes is to allow patents covering "green" technologies to be examined as a matter of 
priority. As a consequence, the time needed to obtain a granted patent could be significantly 
reduced
3
, from several years to just a few months. 
There are several advantages to a reduced examination process. It allows patent 
applicants to start licensing their technologies sooner, thereby reducing the time to market for 
green technologies. Possessing a granted patent may also help start-up companies to raise 
private capital (Lane, 2012). For these reasons, green patents fast-track schemes have been 
expected to accelerate the diffusion of clean technologies
4
. However, an early grant may not 
always be in the interest of patent applicants, who may prefer to wait until the market for the 
technology develops before requesting a grant and incur the associated costs. Therefore, 
whether fast-tracking programmes are successful in practice needs to be examined in light of 
empirical evidence. 
With the earliest green patent fast track programme now in place for three years, it is 
possible to provide a first empirical analysis of the fast-tracking procedures. The purpose of 
this study is to provide such an analysis, based on data from Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, 
Korea, the UK, and the US
5
. In order to analyse the characteristics of fast-tracked patents and 
of companies that resort to these programmes, data sets were assembled from the various 
patent offices and combined with the worldwide patent database PATSTAT and with the 
financial database ORBIS. The  data analysis was complemented with interviews with patent 
attorneys and IP professionals. 
The objective of this paper is to provide an up-to-date picture of the green patent fast-
track programmes landscape and to examine whether these programmes may help the 
                                                        
1
 In the US, the program was designed to be temporary and was closed after the 3,500th application under the 
scheme was received. 
2
 The European Patent Office (EPO) does not have a fast-tracking programme for green patent applications. 
However, the EPO has an accelerated examination procedure that is open to all patent applications irrespective 
of the technology covered. 
3
 Note that accelerated procedures have not been specifically put in place for green patents. Such procedures 
exist in various patent offices. See Tran (2012) for an overview of these procedures. 
4
 Many studies have documented a strong growth in the number of patent applications protecting green 
technologies, suggesting that patents are considered as a useful means of protection against imitation in this 
sector (see Dechezleprêtre et al. 2011). 
5
 We do not have comprehensive data for all patent offices. The highest quality data could be obtained for the 
UK, Canada, Australia and the US. The most detailed results in the report are based on data from the UK and 
the US patent office. 
2 
diffusion of clean technologies. The study provides answers to the following questions: How 
many patents have been filed under the various fast-tracking schemes? What technologies 
have been mostly concerned? Do the programmes significantly reduce the time from filing to 
grant compared to regular examination procedures? What type of company is most likely to 
make use of the fast-tracking procedure? Do the programmes encourage the diffusion of 
clean technological knowledge? 
This paper is the first study to empirically analyse green patent fast-tracking 
procedures. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical analysis has been conducted so far, 
although some aggregate statistics have been made available by some patent offices. Lane 
(2012) and Patton (2012) offer an analysis of green patent fast-tracking programmes from a 
legal point of view. 
Three results stand out from our analysis. First, despite a low participation in the 
programmes which reflects the strong incentive for patent applicants to keep their patents in 
the examination process (hence not granted) for as long as possible, there is a clear demand 
for fast-tracking procedures, in particular from small but fast-growing start-up companies in 
the green technology sector. Secondly, fast-tracking programmes seem to keep up with their 
promises. The time period from application to grant is reduced by up to 75% for patents 
entering the accelerated procedure. Finally, the analysis of patent citation data shows that 
fast-tracking programmes have accelerated the diffusion of knowledge in green technologies 
during the first years following the publication of the patents. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the fast-
tracking programmes currently in place. Section 3 presents some basic statistics about the 
number of patents that have requested accelerated examination so far and provides some 
explanation for the apparent limited participation in the programmes. Section 4 analyses the 
characteristics of the fast-tracked patents, including their technological distribution, time-to-
grant and value. In Section 5, we examined the characteristics of fast-tracked patents' 
applicants. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Overview of the Fast Track Systems 
 
Green patents fast track schemes have been implemented in nine countries so far. This 
section briefly describes each of these schemes
6
. 
 
2.1 UK IPO 
The first green patent fast track scheme was put in place by the UK in May 2009, in the 
context of the run-up to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)  conference in Copenhagen, which was hoped to give birth to the successor of the 
Kyoto protocol. In order to have their patent considered for expedited examination, the 
applicant must submit a letter explaining why the invention is environmentally friendly. The 
IPO does not require evidence for this "environmentally-friendliness" but states it will reject 
clearly inappropriate inventions
7
. There is no formal process requirement on the patent and 
no additional fee is required. According to the UK IPO, patents can be expected to be granted 
in 9 months, compared to 2 to 3 years for the normal examination procedure
8
. 
 
                                                        
6
 This section draws heavily on Lane (2012), Patton (2012) and Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox (2012). 
7
 In the empirical analysis that follows, we show that almost all fast-tracked patent applications actually cover 
green technologies.  
8
 See UK IPO Fast grant guide, available on the IPO website. 
3 
2.2 Australia's IPO 
Australia’s green patent fast tracking program started in September 2009. As in the UK, there 
is no formal definition of what constitutes a green patent. Applicants must simply provide a 
statement that the technology has some environmental benefits. Examination of applications 
under the program is expected to begin within four to eight weeks after filing the request for 
expedited examination and no additional fee is required. 
 
2.3 Korean IPO 
In October 2009 the Korean Intellectual Property Office launched a "super-accelerated 
examination system for green technology". KIPO states that a first office action will be 
issued within one month of the request. Contrary to UK and Australia, only technologies 
which are funded or accredited by the Korean government, or which are mentioned in 
relevant government environmental laws, are eligible for expedited treatment under the 
super-accelerated examination system. Technologies for which all applicants can require 
accelerated examination include noise prevention, water quality, air pollution prevention, 
waste disposal, livestock waste management, recycling and sewage. Other green 
technologies, including renewable energy, carbon emissions reduction, energy-efficient 
transportation, and LEDs are eligible only if the invention has “received financial support or 
certification from the government”.9 In addition to this requirement, applicants must submit 
results of a prior art search along with a request for fast-track examination.
10
 These features 
limit participation in the Korean scheme.
11
  
 
2.4 Japan Patent Office 
Japan Patent Office (JPO) launched its programme to accelerate examination of "Green-
technology related applications" in November 2009. The technologies must be of a kind "that 
has an energy-saving effect and contributes to CO2 reduction". Applicants must provide the 
patent office with “a short description that explains that the claimed invention has an 
advantage in reducing consumption, reducing CO2 and the like in a reasonable manner” and 
must conduct a prior art search and a comparison of the claimed invention to the closest prior 
art. This transfers part of the patent office's work on to the patent applicant. Under the 
program, applicants should receive a first office action in about two months. 
 
2.5 USPTO 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) launched a "Green Technology 
Pilot Program" in November 2009. The program was initially limited to applications falling 
under one of the U.S. Patent Classification (USPC) codes considered to cover “green 
technologies.” These USPC technology classes included alternative energy production; 
energy conservation; environmentally friendly farming; and environmental purification, 
protection, and remediation. However, after a few months the USPTO realized that the 
classification requirement was too restrictive and decided to replace it with a simple 
statement as to why the invention covers a “green technology”. These may include 
applications pertaining to environmental quality, energy conservation, renewable energy or 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction. In addition to these subject matter requirements, the 
                                                        
9
 For example, products developed with the help of the recent government programme "Low-Carbon Green 
Growth Basic Act" are eligible for the super-accelerated examination. 
10
 Note however that under KIPO's three-track patent examination system, applicants may still require 
accelerated (but not "super-accelerated") examination for all other green patent applications. 
11
 These strict conditions suggest that KIPO was concerned about the potentially high volume of requests, a 
concern that might have been legitimate in 2009 but does not appear totally founded today, as this study 
demonstrates (see section 3). 
4 
USPTO also imposes some restrictions on the number of claims made in the patent
12
. 
Applications accepted into the Green Technology Pilot begin examination immediately 
instead of waiting for 2-3 years to start the examination process. 
The USPTO Green Technology Pilot Program closed in early 2012, after the 3,500
th
 
application was received under the scheme. However, other accelerated examination options 
applicable to all technologies are still available for green patents, including the Prioritized 
Examination Program (Track I), the Patent Prosecution Highway, the Accelerated 
Examination Program, and a Petition based on applicant’s age or health. 
 
2.6 Israel patent office 
Israel’s fast tracking program was launched in December 2009. Israel’s Patent Office allowed 
green patents to receive priority examination, a procedure usually available only when 
infringement is suspected. The subject matter requirement is very broad: to request 
accelerated examination, the applicant must simply provide an explanation as to why the 
invention helps advance environmental protection. The extra fees normally required for 
priority examination are not required for green patents. After qualifying under the program, 
these green patent applications shall be examined within three months. 
 
2.7 Canada IPO 
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) launched its fast track program for green 
patent applications in March 2011. To benefit from the programme, applicants should make a 
declaration stating that the invention could "help resolve or mitigate negative environmental 
impacts or help conserve the natural environment". No additional fee is required. Under the 
fast track program, the applicant shall receive a first office action within two months instead 
of about 2-3 years in the ordinary course.  
 
2.8 Brazil IPO 
Brazil was the first emerging economy to launch a green patent fast track programme. In 
April 2012 the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) launched a pilot program to 
accelerate green patent applications. The pilot program will be limited to the first 500 
petitions granted. Eligible green technologies fall under the following categories: alternative 
energy, transportation, energy conservation, waste management and agriculture.
13
 An 
additional fee of roughly USD 500 for "strategic priority examination" is required. The goal 
of the program is to reduce the period of examination of patent applications related to green 
technologies to less than two years.  Average examination time in Brazil is five years and 
four months. 
 
2.9 China's IPO 
China's State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) was the last patent office to launch a green 
patent fast track programme in August 2012. Eligible technologies must be related to energy 
saving, environmental protection, new energy, new energy vehicles, low-carbon technology 
and resource-saving technology. Interestingly, the fast track scheme also covers some non-
environmental technologies that are deemed crucial for China's economic development: new 
generation of information technology, biology, high-end equipment manufacturing, and new 
material. A search report has to be provided by patent applicants together with the request for 
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 The application must have three or fewer independent claims, 20 or fewer total claims and no multiple 
dependent claims. The application must also "claim a single invention directed to environmental quality". 
13
 Nuclear energy was explicitly excluded following the nuclear power plant accident in Fukushima, Japan, in 
March 2011. 
5 
accelerated examination. Applications accepted under the programme will be examined 
within one year after the applicant's request is approved. 
Table 1 summarizes the information presented in section 2. 
 
Table 1: Description of green patent fast track programmes 
Country Starting date Technologies covered 
   
UK May 2009 All environmentally friendly inventions 
Australia September 2009 All environmentally friendly inventions 
Korea October 2009 
Technologies funded or accredited by the Korean 
government, or mentioned in relevant government 
environmental laws 
Japan November 2009 Energy-saving & CO2 reduction 
US December 2009* 
Environmental quality, energy conservation, 
development of renewable energy resources or 
greenhouse gas emission reduction 
Israel December 2009 All environmentally friendly inventions 
Canada March 2011 All environmentally friendly inventions 
Brazil April 2012 
Alternative energy, transportation, energy 
conservation, waste management and agriculture 
China August 2012 
Energy saving technologies, environmental protection, 
new energy, new energy vehicles 
   
* Note: the USPTO programme was temporary and closed after the 3,500
th
 application under 
the scheme was received 
Source: author. 
 
 
3. How Many Patents Have Gone Through the Fast-Tracking 
Programmes? 
 
3.1 Distribution of patents by patent office 
Table 2 shows the number of green patents that went through each fast-tracking programme 
to date. The numbers go from a mere 43 patents in Australia to 3533 patents in the US. Israel 
and Canada also experienced a rather low number of filings, with respectively 78 and 67 
patents to date requesting accelerated examination. The UK has had the second largest 
programme so far, with 776 requests between March 2009 and June 2012. The Korean patent 
office received 604 requests, but 158 were rejected (in comparison, only 1% of requests at the 
UK patent office have been rejected). Japan received around 200 requests in 2010 but data 
for 2011 and 2012 has not been made public yet.  
  
6 
Table 2: Number of patents under each of the fast track programmes 
Country Period of analysis Fast-tracked green patents 
   
Australia September 2009 – August 2012 43 
Canada March 2011 – August 2012 67 
UK May 2009 – June 2012 776 
Israel December 2009 – September 2012 78 
Japan November 2009 – December 2010 220 
Korea October 2009 – June 2012 604 
US December 2009 – March 2012 3533 
Source: author. 
 
In order to take into account the time period over which the programmes have been in 
place, Table 3 shows the annual number of requests in each patent office. The number of 
requests in Australia appears very small, with around 15 patents only per year. Japan, Korea 
and the UK receive a comparable 200-250 requests per year. With 1500 annual requests, the 
USPTO stands out as the programme with the highest number of requests, which is not 
surprising given the number of patent applications received by the USPTO on an average 
year (see below).  
To assess the success of the programmes, Table 3 further compares the number of 
annual fast-track requests to the annual number of green patents
14
 filed in each patent office 
(column 3) and to the total annual number of patent applications filed (column 5). Two 
results stand out. First, as can be expected, the number of patents requiring accelerated 
examination under the green patent programmes represent a tiny share of total patent filings 
in each patent office: between 0.05% in Australia and 0.90% in the UK. Secondly, only a 
small share of green patents choose to request accelerated examination. The figures range 
from less than 1% of green patents in Australia to over 20% in the UK. The US and Israel 
stand in between with respectively 8% and 13% of the average number of green patents filed 
annually requesting accelerated examination. The proportion is between 1% and 2% in 
Canada, Japan and Korea. This suggests that either patent applicants are unaware of the 
existence of the programmes, either it is not always in their best interest to request 
accelerated examination. We explore this last point in the next subsection. 
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 Since each programme have their own requirements in terms of what constitutes a green patent (see Table 1), 
the number of green patents filed annually is calculated differently in each patent office to reflect the 
requirements of each programme. 
7 
Table 3: Number of annual patents in the fast track programmes as a share of green 
and total patents 
Country 
Annual patents 
in FT programs 
Annual green patents Annual total patents 
# % # % 
      
Australia 14.3 1896 0.76% 29480 0.05% 
Canada 44.7 2720 1.64% 36949 0.12% 
UK 258.7 1237 20.91% 28638 0.90% 
Israel 28.4 216 13.13% 8004 0.35% 
Japan 203.7 13741 1.48% 349193 0.06% 
Korea 219.6 11680 1.88% 168646 0.13% 
US 1514.1 18421 8.22% 414362 0.36% 
Note: the numbers are the author's own calculations based on the Patstat database 
Source: author. 
 
3.2 Understanding the low usage rate of fast-tracking programmes 
The analysis presented in Section 3.1 shows that only a small share of patents eligible for 
accelerated examination – between 1% and 20% depending on the patent office – actually 
goes through the various programmes. An analysis of the legal literature, complemented with 
interviews with patent attorneys and IP professionals in various sectors, may help to 
understand why patent applicants frequently choose not to make use of the fast-tracking 
programs. 
As mentioned above, there are several advantages to a reduced examination process. 
First, it may allow patent applicants to start licensing their technologies sooner, thereby 
increasing the company's revenue. Second, possessing a granted patent can help companies in 
the clean technology sector to raise private capital (Lane, 2012). Finally, granting a patent 
may justify taking legal action in the case of suspected infringement. 
However, there are also some disadvantages in accelerating the granting of a patent. 
To begin with, requiring an accelerated examination may add costs to the application in 
patent offices that require applicants who request accelerated examination to conduct a search 
report on the prior art, as is the case at JPO. Some programmes require additional 
commentary by the applicant, to explain differences between the prior art and the application 
being prosecuted (e.g. in Japan). Since anything an applicant includes in an application may 
be used against him in terms of construing the scope of the application (i.e. the claims), 
applicants may be wary of such requirements.  
More importantly, it is not always in the applicant's best interest to have his patent 
published or granted as soon as possible. Patent applicants indeed face a trade-off between 
the need to secure patent protection as early as possible, and the incentive to keep the final 
content of the patent open for as long as possible. 
The first term of the trade-off is quite intuitive. Inventors have strong incentives to file 
a first ("priority") application as soon as possible because until this moment, they have 
nothing but secret to oppose imitators. In this context, an information leakage on the 
invention would be twice damageable. It would enable competitors to use the invention 
legally, and may prevent the invention from being ever patented (since through the leakage it 
has become prior art
15
). Even if the secret is well kept, there is a risk under the first-to-file 
                                                        
15
 In some countries, a grace period may however allow for public disclosure of an invention (under certain 
conditions) without affecting the validity of a subsequent patent application up to a certain delay.  
8 
rule
16
 that the patent would be granted to another inventor that files an application first. 
Applying for a patent alleviates these risks, as it freezes relevant prior art at the date of 
application, and guarantees that the patent, once granted, can be opposed to any infringer. 
Although inventors may want to file a priority application as early as possible, they 
also have serious motives to delay as much as possible the moment when their patent will be 
granted: 
(i) An important advantage of a long examination period is that it delays the costs 
associated with the grant of the patent. It also gives patent applicants time to determine 
whether it is worth requesting the grant in the first place. Since a grant implies additional 
costs (renewal fees, etc.), applicants first need to make sure that the patent will be 
commercially viable before going any further with the grant process. A long examination 
period thus has an important option value for the applicant, which explains the success of 
mechanisms such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). One of the key benefits of filing a 
patent under the PCT is that patent applicants then have thirty months to decide whether they 
want to proceed towards the grant of one or more national (or regional) patents. 
(ii) Another major advantage of a delayed examination process is that it leaves applicants 
with the possibility to adjust the patent application – in particular the list of claims – during 
the examination process
17
. Therefore, early grants can occur when the invention and its 
market are not yet mature, which induces opportunity costs for the applicant. Indeed, if 
granted too early, the design of the patent may not perfectly match the final version of the 
invention, thus facilitating circumvention. To avoid such discrepancies, applicants need to 
delay the moment when the patent is granted with its definitive claims. Patent offices 
worldwide offer some flexibility in this respect, through the use of divisional applications, 
continuations and reissued patents (see Dechezleprêtre and Ménière, 2010, for an analysis of 
these mechanisms). 
(iii) A potential issue may concern the early publication of the patent. When a patent is 
published, it reveals important information on on-going R&D to competitors. This should 
provide an incentive for applicants to delay publication. Since patent applications must be 
disclosed when granted, a very early grant that would happen before the end of the 18 months 
time period after which patent applications are normally published could increase the risk that 
competitors will be able to quickly design a competing technology. Our interviews with IP 
professionals however revealed that this is unlikely to be an issue in practice. 
The consequence of what precedes is that patent applicants have an interest in using 
fast-tracking programmes only under specific circumstances (suspicion of infringement, 
capital raising activity, securing commercial partnerships, among others). This explains why 
only a small percentage of eligible patents are found to be using this opportunity. Since once 
filed, what will be opposed to infringers will be the date of application and not the grant date, 
most applicants in fact have an incentive to wait until the examination is conducted under the 
regular procedure.  
 
3.3  Are fast-tracked green patents crowding-out other patents? 
A potential problem of fast-tracking programmes for green patent applications is that they 
may delay examination of patent applications in other technologies. An important 
consequence of the trade-off presented in Section 3.2 is that most patent applicants are 
actually happy to see the examination of their patent applications postponed. If, following 
Table 3, we assume that fast-tracking is appealing for at most 20% of patents in non-green 
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 In a first-to-file system, the right to the grant of a patent for a given invention lies with the first person to file a 
patent application for protection of that invention, regardless of the date of actual invention. This rule is used in 
most countries except the United States, where the first-to-invent rule still prevails.  
17
 Note however that an applicant must fully disclose their invention at the time of filing. 
9 
technologies, this means that crowding-out is likely to be an issue for only 20% of patent 
applications delayed because of fast-tracking programmes. This represents only around 1,000 
patents since 2009 worldwide, suggesting that crowding-out is unlikely to have been a 
significant issue so far.
18
 
 
 
4. The Characteristics of Fast-Tracked Patents 
 
4.1  Distribution by technology type 
The distribution of patents by technology type is presented in Figure 1 for the five countries 
for which detailed data could be obtained: UK, USA, Australia, Canada and Israel. For 
presentation purposes, we group patents by broad technology groups but the detailed 
technology breakdown for each of the five countries is presented in Annex 1. 
Three results stand out from the analysis of technologies. First, despite the absence of 
any strict definition of what constitutes a green patent in most of the fast-track programmes, 
nearly all patents cover environment-related technologies
19
. Second, climate change-related 
technologies represent the majority of patents in all fast-tracking programmes, with the 
exception of Israel. Third, the top technologies differ greatly across countries, reflecting 
national specificities. Most patents in the US concern renewable energy technologies, in 
particular wind and solar power. They are followed by transport-related technologies. 
However, most of these patents cover energy-efficient technologies for internal combustion 
engines and not electric and hybrid vehicles. Interestingly, CCS is the main technology for 
which accelerated examination is requested in Australia and Canada. This can be related to 
Australia's dependence on coal-based electricity production and to Canada's booming tar sand 
mining industry. In Canada, CCS is followed by biomass patents, which reflects the 
abundance of biomass resources in the country. In Israel, 30% of fast-tracked patents cover 
water-related technologies, in particular grey water reuse and desalination technologies, 
which is not surprising given Israel's strong water scarcity problems. In the UK, other 
environmental technologies – such as recycling or water-saving technologies – also represent 
a significant share of patents. Interestingly, there are more solar patents in the UK 
programme than wind patents.  
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 Crowding-out issues could be completely avoided if, as we argue in the conclusion of this paper, accelerated 
examination was extended to non-green technologies. 
19
 An exception is for example Canada IPO patent number 2628144, which covers a "Method and system to 
promote actions such as environmental and charitable actions". Such exceptions are very seldom. 
10 
Figure 1: – Distribution of patents by technology 
United Kingdom United States 
  
Canada Australia 
  
Israel  
 
 
Source: author. 
 
4.2 Time-to-grant compared to regular procedures 
The main objective of fast-track programmes is to accelerate the examination and the 
potential grant of patents. We compute in Table 4 the average time period from application to 
grant for the fast-tracked patents and compare this with the average time to grant for patents 
11 
that were published during the same years but experienced the regular examination 
procedure. 
Table 4 shows that fast-tracking programmes have kept up with their promises. In the 
UK, the average time from application to grant for patents published between 2009 and 2011 
was 3 years and 4 months. In comparison, fast-tracked patents were granted in 9 months on 
average. This represents a 75% reduction in the time-to-grant period. The other patent offices 
for which this information could be gathered also show a significant albeit slightly smaller 
reduction in the time-to-grant period. In Canada, this period is reduced by 68%, from 7.8 
years on average to 2.5 years only
20
. Australia and Israel also reduced this period by around 
one half. In the US, the reduction is slightly lower, but we suspect this is due to the strict 
initial programme rules that have since been modified
21
. 
 
Table 4: Time to grant in fast track programmes compared with regular examination 
Country All patents Fast tracked patents 
Reduction in time to 
grant 
    
Australia 3.7 years 1.9 years 49% 
Canada 7.8 years 2.5 years 68% 
UK 3.3 years 0.8 years 75% 
US 2.8 years 1.6 years 42% 
Israel 5.4 years 2.8 years 48% 
Japan 6.4 years n.a. n.a. 
Korea 2.4 years n.a. n.a. 
  Source: author. 
 
4.3 The value of fast-tracked patents 
Do fast-tracked patents differ from non-fast tracked patents, in particular environmental 
ones? We investigate this issue by looking at three different measures of patent value: the 
number of countries in which each patent has been filed (so called the family size of patents), 
the likelihood of becoming a "triadic" patent and the number of claims made in the patent. It 
has been empirically demonstrated that the number of countries in which a patent is filed is 
correlated with other indicators of patent value (see, for example, Lanjouw et al, 1998, 
Harhoff et al, 2003). International patent families also have the advantage of being rapidly 
available to researchers, as patent applicants must file all foreign extensions of a patent at 
most 30 months after the first (priority) patent has been filed. Another widely used measure 
of patent value is to focus on so-called triadic patents, which are those patents that have been 
taken out in all three of the world's major patents offices: the European Patent Office (EPO), 
the Japan Patent Office (JPO) and the United States Patents and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
Triadic patents have been used extensively as a way to focus on high-value patents (Dernis, 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2001; Dernis and Khan, 2004). 
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 The period from application to grant in Canada is typically very long as applicants have to request the 
examination of the patent for the procedure to start. The examination is thus requested at a very late stage, when 
applicants are certain of the economic value of the patent. The average time from request of examination to 
grant for "regular" patents for the last 3 fiscal years was 4.2 years. In comparison, the average time from request 
of examination to Grant for fast-tracked patents is 1.7 years. 
21
 The initial rules of the programme made patents eligible only if they had been filed before December 8, 2009. 
This rule was changed in November 2010, so the time to grant is likely to go down as more recent data becomes 
available. Our detailed USPTO data, including time to grant, covers only the first 800 patents that went through 
the programme. 
12 
In order to compare fast-tracked patents with patents that did not participate in the 
programmes, we construct a control group that includes all patents filed at the same patent 
offices
22
 during the same years as fast-tracked patents and we then carry out econometric 
analysis to compare fast-tracked patents with otherwise similar but "normal-track" patents in 
terms of their value. 
The results from the econometric analysis are presented in Table 5. We consistently 
find a significant difference between the value of fast-tracked and that of regular patents. 
Fast-tracked patents are filed in 15% more countries on average than non fast-tracked patents. 
This represents an increase from 2.5 countries to 2.83 countries on average. The results are 
even more compelling when we look at triadic patents, which represent the high end of the 
distribution of patents in terms of commercial value. Here we find that fast-tracked patents 
are up to 56% more likely to be filed in all major patent offices than non fast-tracked patents. 
While an average 15% of patents are filed in the three major patent offices, the (conditional) 
likelihood of a fast-tracked patent to be a "triadic" patent jumps to over 20%. Finally, when 
we look at the number of claims made in the grant publication, we find that fast-tracked 
patents have 31% more claims than non fast-tracked patents. While patents published in the 
US list 13 claims on average, this rises to 17 for fast-tracked patents
23
. 
Overall, our results consistently show that fast-tracked patents are of higher value than 
equivalent patents going through the normal procedure. Importantly, these results hold when 
we include patent applicant fixed effects
24
, meaning that among a company's patent portfolio, 
fast-tracked patents are of higher value than the average patent. This suggests that patent 
applicants, who have private information on the value of their patent applications, require 
accelerated examination for patent applications that are of higher value, are more 
commercially viable and thus may have been the subject of commercial interest from 
potential business partners
25
. 
  
                                                        
22
 We focus the analysis on UK and US patents for which we have the most detailed information. 
23
 The PATSTAT database does not have information on the number of claims made in UK patents. 
24
 Results not reported for brevity and available from author upon request. 
25
 Note that this finding might not be specific to green patents. It might be robust to all fast-tracked patent 
applications, but in the absence of data on non-green fast-tracked patents, we cannot investigate this possibility. 
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Table 5: Patent value 
Notes: *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 
1% level. The dependent variable is the number of patent offices in which each country is 
filed (family size) in columns (1) and (2) and is the number of claims made by each patent in 
columns (5) and (6). Columns (1) and (5) estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
and column (2) and (6) estimated by negative binomial maximum likelihood. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the patent is triadic in columns (3) 
and (4). Column (3) estimated by probit and column (4) estimated by logit. All equations 
include 166 dummy variables for each office - application month, a dummy variable for 
"green" patent according to the EPO classification and a constant. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 
4.4 Knowledge spillovers from fast-tracked patents 
One of the main objectives of fast-tracking programmes is to accelerate the diffusion of green 
technological knowledge in the economy.  
In this regard, patent citations offer an attractive way to analyse knowledge diffusion. When a 
patent is filed, it must include citations to previous patents upon which the inventor has built 
to develop the new technology. Therefore, patent citations have been used intensively to 
measure knowledge flows (see for example Jaffe et al., 1993; Peri, 2005). 
Here we implement a similar econometric approach as in Section 4.3 and analyse if 
there is any systematic difference in the number of citations received between fast-tracked 
patents and normal-track patents. To deal with one of the most common problems associated 
with patent citations, we exclude self-citations by inventors. We also run regressions where 
we restrict citations to those made by patent applicants only, thus excluding citations added 
by patent examiners, which might not capture knowledge flows. Note that patent citations 
capture not only knowledge spillovers but also patent value, so our regressions include 
controls for patent value such as family size. 
The results are presented in Table 6. Compared with patents filed in the same month, 
of similar value but not fast-tracked, fast-tracked patents received twice as many citations in 
the same time period. The estimated impact of fast-tracking on forward citations ranges 
between 50% and 150%, depending on whether citations made by examiners are included or 
not. Thus, there appears to be strong evidence that green patent fast-tracking programmes 
accelerate the diffusion of knowledge in green technologies in the short run – i.e. during the 
first years following the publication of the patents. It will be interesting to see in a few years 
whether this effect remains in the long run, but the short-term impact is compelling. Given 
the urgency of addressing environmental issues, including climate change, this result is an 
encouraging feature of the fast-tracking programmes. 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     
Dep. Var. Family size Triadic patent Claims 
       
       
Fast-track 
0.151*** 0.144*** 0.278*** 0.561*** 0.312*** 0.343*** 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.056) (0.104) (0.015) (0.015) 
       
Patent office X 
Month FE 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 2255141 2255141 2255141 2255141 850210 850210 
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Table 6: Knowledge diffusion 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Dep. Var. All forward citations Forward citations by applicants 
       
       
       
Fast-track 
1.534*** 1.536*** 1.322*** 0.559*** 0.536*** 0.562*** 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.153) (0.152) (0.164) 
Family size 
 -0.004*** 0.007***  0.036*** 0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.003) 
Claims 
  0.015***   0.012*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
       
Patent office X 
Month FE 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Observations 2221075 2221075 849465 2221075 2221075 849465 
       
Notes: *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 
1% level. The dependent variable is the total number of citations received by each patent in 
columns (1) to (3) and the number of citations received by each patent and made by 
applicants only in columns (4) to (6). All columns are estimated by Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood. All equations include 166 dummy variables for each office - 
application month, a dummy variable for "green" patent according to the EPO classification 
and a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
5. An Analysis of Fast-Tracking Programmes Users 
 
In this section, the characteristics of companies resorting to fast-tracking programmes are 
examined. 
 
5.1 Nationality of applicants 
We were able to obtain the nationality of applicants for the UK and the US programmes. The 
distribution of applicant countries is shown in Figure 2. A more detailed breakdown is 
available in Annex 2. As can be seen from Figure 2, the majority of requests for accelerated 
examination come from domestic applicants. UK-based applicants represent 76% of requests 
at the UK IP office, while US-based applicants are responsible for 86% of requests at the 
USPTO. Foreign applicants are mainly from OECD countries, most notably US applicants in 
the UK and applicants from Japan and South Korea in the US. Very few applicants from 
emerging economies can be found. For example, Chinese applicants only filed 6 requests in 
the UK and 4 requests in the US. 
When we compare applicants requesting accelerated examination with all applicants 
of green patents at the UK and the US patent offices in the last few years, we find that 
domestic applicants are much more likely than foreign applicants to participate in the fast-
tracking programmes. 62% of green patent applications at the UK patent office are filed by 
domestic applicants. At the USPTO, domestic applicants file only 50% of green patent 
applications. This suggests that foreign applicants might be unaware of the existence of the 
programmes. This is also likely the result of applicants only wanting to expedite the first 
15 
application, which is usually filed in the home country. That first filed application will 
probably be prosecuted by the person who originally drafted the case. Since that practitioner 
may have the best overall context for the patent application, they may be in a better position 
to make the most strategic amendments
26
. This potential explanation is supported by the 
observation that among all US and UK fast-tracked patents, we haven't found a single pair of 
patents belonging to the same international patent family. 
It is very common that multinational companies have their patent filings being taken 
care of by the local subsidiary. Therefore looking at the location of applicants may fail to 
uncover all cross-border patent transfers. To mitigate this issue we look instead at the country 
of residence of inventors, as reported on patent applications. The breakdown is shown on 
Figure 3 (a more detailed breakdown is available in Annex 3).  
 
Figure 2: Nationality of patent applicants 
United Kingdom United States 
  
Source: author. 
 
Figure 3: Inventors' country of residence (USPTO) 
United Kingdom USA 
  
Source: author.  
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 We are very grateful to Allison Mages (GE)for pointing this out. 
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The picture does not change much for the UK, although we notice a larger share of 
US-based inventors than suggested by the applicants' data. Interestingly, only 77% of 
inventors of patents in the USPTO programme reside in the US (as compared to 86% of 
applicants). Over 5% of inventors are from Germany. Importantly, India and China appear in 
the top 5 foreign inventor countries, with respectively 21 and 15 patent applications, 
suggesting that the patents are being transferred by Chinese and Indian multinational 
companies. 
 
5.2 Fast-tracked patents in companies' patent portfolios 
The 1304 UK and US published patents on which detailed data is available have been filed 
by 531 applicants. This means that applicants requested accelerated examination for 2.4 
patents on average (the median applicant filed 1 request). 72% of applicants requested 
accelerated examination for a single patent and only 7% requested accelerated examination 
for five patents or more (see Figure 4). The top companies include Ford (the car 
manufacturer), General Electric, Bridgelux (a lighting company), ConocoPhillips (a chemical 
engineering company), and Mistubishi Heavy Industries (mostly for wind energy patents). 
 
Figure 4: Number of fast-tracked patents per patent applicant  
 
Source: author. 
What share of their patent portfolio do fast-tracked patents represent? In Figure 5, we 
graph the proportion of patents in their current portfolio for which companies
27
 have required 
accelerated examination. We find that while only 20% of companies requested accelerated 
examination for some of the patents in their portfolio, 80% of them requested accelerated 
procedure for all of their green patents. The procedure appears as a systematic strategy for 
most applicants.  
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 Note that this analysis includes only patent applicants for which we were able to collect the complete patent 
portfolio. This explains why the total number of companies is smaller in Figure 3 than in Figure 2. 
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Figure 5: Share of patent portfolio in fast-track procedure  
 
Source: author. 
 
5.3 The specificities of fast-track programme users 
The fact that most applicants systematically choose to request the accelerated procedure 
while only a few use it on an ad-hoc basis suggests that companies joining the programme 
might differ in some systematic manner from companies which stay out. In order to look at 
this issue, the data on patents filed at the UK IP office is matched with the worldwide 
financial information database Orbis. This allows us to obtain detailed information on the 
patent applicants, including assets, revenue and employment. Users of the programme (for at 
least one patent) are then compared with non-users (as defined by all other applicants of 
green patents
28
 at the UK IP office) in terms of revenue, assets, number of employees and 
size of the patent portfolio. vidence that fast-track users differ statistically from non-users in 
that they tend to have smaller revenues and smaller but faster-growing assets. In other words, 
the fast-tracking programme seems to appeal particularly to start-up companies in the green 
technology sector that are currently raising capital but still generate small revenue. Figure 6 
illustrates this result by plotting the population of green patent holders against revenue and 
assets and distinguishing between users  and non-users
29
 of the fast-tracking programme. This 
shows that fast-track users are over-represented in the lower-left corner of the graph. The 
reason for this result is that patents are more critical to the survival of start-up companies 
than of larger, established companies. 
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 Applicants of green patents might differ systematically from companies not involved in clean technologies. 
Thus it is important to compare fast-track users with other green patent holders and not with the population of 
patent applicants. Moreover, companies in non-green sectors cannot use the fast-tracking programmes, so they 
cannot help us understand why some companies choose to use the programme. 
29
 Users are represented by diamond figures and non-users in grey circles.  
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Figure 6: Fast-track users and non-users in terms of revenue and assets  
 
Source: author. 
 
These differences seem to be particularly high when one compares companies that use 
the programme for all of their patents with occasional users and with non-users. The 
comparison is presented in Figures 7 and 8 for asset growth and revenue respectively. These 
dispersion diagrams represent the spread of values in the distribution of the variable for the 
three groups considered. The grey box shows the values under which 50% of the distribution 
falls. 
 
Figure 7: Asset growth of systematic fast-track users, occasional users and non-users 
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Figure 8: Revenue of systematic fast-track users, occasional users and non-users 
  
Source: author. 
 
Figures 7 and 8 clearly show that companies resorting systematically to fast-tracking 
programmes have a higher growth rate of assets and a lower revenue than non-users. 
Occasional users stand somewhat in the middle in terms of revenue and are similar to non-
users in terms of asset growth. These results confirm that the fast-tracking programme is 
particularly relevant for green start-up companies. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we conduct the first empirical analysis of the green patent fast-tracking 
programmes that have recently been put in place in various patent offices worldwide. For this 
purpose, we assembled detailed data from Australia, Canada, Israel, the UK and the US, and 
some more aggregated data from Japan and Korea. 
Only a small share of green patents request accelerated examination. However, there 
is an important discrepancy across patent offices: the numbers range from less than 1% of 
green patents in Australia to over 20% in the UK. The participation rate is very low in 
Canada, Japan and Korea (les than 2% of green patents) and significantly higher in the US 
(8%) and Israel (13%). However, as our interviews with patent attorneys reveal, the 
participation rate into green patent fast-tracking programmes cannot be expected to reach 
100%, since patent applicants usually have a strong incentive to keep their patent applications 
in the examination process for as long as possible. However, the high participation rate in the 
UK (20%) shows that there is a demand for this type of mechanism from patent applicants, 
and that participation could be enhanced in other patent offices, maybe by increasing 
communication over the programmes. In particular, it appears that domestic applicants are 
vastly overrepresented in the fast-track programmes, suggesting that participation of foreign 
applicants might be enhanced. 
The data assembled for this paper suggests that fast-tracking programmes do keep up 
with their promises. The time period from application to grant is reduced by up to 75% for 
patents entering the accelerated procedures. More importantly, analysis of patent citation data 
shows that fast-tracking programmes have accelerated the diffusion of knowledge in green 
technologies during the first few years that followed the publication of the fast-tracked 
patents. Whether this effect will remain in the long run, however, remains to be seen. 
The main advantage of fast-tracking programmes is that they bring a welcomed 
differentiation into patent examination procedures. Patent applicants who can benefit strongly 
20 
from an early grant can choose to request accelerated examination
30
. The data shows that this 
concerns mostly fast-growing start-up companies in the 'green tech' industry, who can use a 
granted patent to raise capital or to license their technology and start making revenue. Other 
patent applicants who prefer to keep learning about how the market for their technology 
develops before requesting grant can do so by not opting in.  
In fact, similar differentiation mechanisms not restricted to green technologies already 
exist in several patent offices. For example, the European Patent Office has an accelerated 
examination procedure in place that applicants can request at no additional cost. Under the 
USPTO's three-track prioritized examination system (which is not yet fully implemented), 
applicants can choose between three examination procedures: prioritized examination, 
"normal" examination, and delayed examination. The Korean patent office has a similar 
system in place
31
. Should patent offices, then, restrict such programmes to green patents 
only? Given the urgency of environmental issues, it might make sense to prioritize green 
patents for the time being, but we believe that they should ideally be open to all types of 
technologies, for at least two reasons. First, it is sometimes difficult to foresee the 
environmental benefits of a newly discovered technology
32
. Secondly, accelerated procedures 
open to all technologies would be completely free of any potential crowding-out issues, since 
no patent application willing to be examined as a matter of priority could be excluded from 
the scheme. 
One of the main limitations of this analysis is that we have not been able to assess to 
what extent fast-tracking programmes have accelerated the diffusion of green patented 
technologies, in particular through licensing. A survey of programme users could help answer 
this question, and refine our understanding of the advantages and drawbacks of accelerated 
examination. This is left for future research. 
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 As economists would put it, they self-select into the scheme. 
31
 Applicants can choose between Accelerated Examination (examined within three months of filing), Regular 
Examination, and Customer-deferred Examination (examined within three months of the date requested by the 
customer). 
32
 For example, GPS for road users allow saving fuel by determining the shortest itinerary, but would GPS have 
been considered a green technology from the outset? 
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Annex 1 – Distribution of Patents by Technology 
Table A1: Distribution of patents by technology – Australia 
Green technology Number of patents Share 
CCS 14 32.6% 
Solar 5 11.6% 
Agriculture 3 7.0% 
Combustion 3 7.0% 
Transport 3 7.0% 
Wood 3 7.0% 
Others 3 7.0% 
Lighting 2 4.7% 
Smart grids 2 4.7% 
Geothermal 2 4.7% 
Hydro 1 2.3% 
Wind 1 2.3% 
Insulation 1 2.3% 
 
 
Table A2: Distribution of patents by technology - Canada 
Green technology Number of patents Share 
CCS 11 14.7% 
Biomass 9 12.0% 
Biofuel 8 10.7% 
Other 6 8.0% 
Depollution 6 8.0% 
Storage 4 5.3% 
Waste 4 5.3% 
Marine 4 5.3% 
Wind 4 5.3% 
Hydrogen 3 4.0% 
Gas 3 4.0% 
Other renewables 3 4.0% 
Transport 2 2.7% 
Solar 2 2.7% 
Combustion 2 2.7% 
Heating 1 1.3% 
Efficiency 1 1.3% 
Agriculture 1 1.3% 
Insulation 1 1.3% 
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Table A3: Distribution of patents by technology - UK 
Green technology Number of patents Share 
Wind  46 5.9% 
Water  64 8.2% 
Recycling  63 8.1% 
Solar  56 7.2% 
Energy Saving  229 29.5% 
Vehicle  149 19.2% 
Other  169 21.8% 
 
 
Table A4: Distribution of patents by technology - US 
Green technology Number of patents Share 
Wind 214 25.63% 
Solar 108 12.93% 
Lighting 88 10.54% 
Internal combustion engine 75 8.98% 
Energy efficiency 58 6.95% 
Bioengineering 42 5.03% 
Storage 34 4.07% 
Chemical engineering 28 3.35% 
Fuel cell 19 2.28% 
Electric vehicle 19 2.28% 
Emissions controls 19 2.28% 
Biofuel 16 1.92% 
Wastewater treatment 16 1.92% 
Materials 13 1.56% 
Renewable 11 1.32% 
Hybrid vehicle 10 1.20% 
Production 10 1.20% 
Fossil fuel 9 1.08% 
Recycling 6 0.72% 
Green building 6 0.72% 
Vehicle 6 0.72% 
Hydroelectric 6 0.72% 
Wave 4 0.48% 
Geothermal 3 0.36% 
CCS 2 0.24% 
Photovoltaics 2 0.24% 
Fluid flow 2 0.24% 
Trading & offsets 2 0.24% 
Generation 1 0.12% 
Distribution efficiency 1 0.12% 
Roadway 1 0.12% 
Fertilizer alternative 1 0.12% 
Yield enhancement 1 0.12% 
Liquid purification 1 0.12% 
Disaster 1 0.12% 
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Table A5: Distribution of patents by technology - Israel 
Green technology Number of patents Share 
Water 23 29.49% 
Other 16 20.51% 
Solar 8 10.26% 
Electric vehicle 5 6.41% 
Hydro 3 3.85% 
Waste 3 3.85% 
Energy efficiency 3 3.85% 
Wind 2 2.56% 
Wastewater 2 2.56% 
CCS 2 2.56% 
Marine 2 2.56% 
Storage 2 2.56% 
Internal combustion engine 1 1.28% 
Materials 1 1.28% 
Recycling 1 1.28% 
Pollution 1 1.28% 
Transport 1 1.28% 
Buildings 1 1.28% 
Geothermal 1 1.28% 
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Annex 2 – Nationality of Applicants 
Table A9: Nationality of applicants – UK 
Country Number of patents Share 
UK 645 76.60% 
US 107 12.71% 
Norway 11 1.31% 
Israel 10 1.19% 
Denmark 8 0.95% 
Germany 6 0.71% 
Ireland 6 0.71% 
Japan 5 0.59% 
Singapore 4 0.48% 
China 3 0.36% 
Hong Kong 3 0.36% 
Mexico 3 0.36% 
Portugal 3 0.36% 
Switzerland 3 0.36% 
Taiwan 3 0.36% 
Australia 2 0.24% 
Belgium 2 0.24% 
Finland 2 0.24% 
France 2 0.24% 
Mauritius 2 0.24% 
Spain 2 0.24% 
Sweden 2 0.24% 
Czech Republic 1 0.12% 
Estonia 1 0.12% 
Netherlands 1 0.12% 
New Zealand 1 0.12% 
Russian Federation 1 0.12% 
Thailand 1 0.12% 
UAE 1 0.12% 
Uganda 1 0.12% 
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Table A10: Nationality of applicants – US 
Country Number of patents Share 
United States 726 86.84% 
Japan 24 2.87% 
South Korea 21 2.51% 
United Kingdom 14 1.67% 
Switzerland 10 1.20% 
Canada 8 0.96% 
Denmark 6 0.72% 
Cayman Islands 5 0.60% 
Austria 3 0.36% 
Israel 3 0.36% 
Peoples’ Republic of China 2 0.24% 
Hong Kong, China 2 0.24% 
Singapore 2 0.24% 
Taiwan 2 0.24% 
Australia 1 0.12% 
Brazil 1 0.12% 
France 1 0.12% 
Germany 1 0.12% 
Italy 1 0.12% 
Luxembourg 1 0.12% 
New Zealand 1 0.12% 
Saudi Arabia 1 0.12% 
 
 
Table A11: Nationality of inventors – US 
Country Number of patents Share 
United States 648 77.51% 
Germany 43 5.14% 
India 21 2.51% 
South Korea 21 2.51% 
Japan 19 2.27% 
Peoples' Republic of China 15 1.79% 
Netherlands 14 1.67% 
United Kingdom 12 1.44% 
Canada 7 0.84% 
Denmark 6 0.72% 
Israel 6 0.72% 
Taiwan 6 0.72% 
Austria 4 0.48% 
Spain 4 0.48% 
Australia 2 0.24% 
Switzerland 2 0.24% 
Brazil 1 0.12% 
Hong Kong, China 1 0.12% 
France 1 0.12% 
Luxembourg 1 0.12% 
New Zealand 1 0.12% 
Saudi Arabia 1 0.12% 
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Table A12: Nationality of inventors – UK 
Country Number of patents Share 
UK 223 68.20% 
USA 74 22.63% 
Germany 5 1.53% 
Ireland 4 1.22% 
Taiwan 3 0.92% 
Australia 2 0.61% 
China 2 0.61% 
Mauritius 2 0.61% 
Singapore 2 0.61% 
South Africa 2 0.61% 
Spain 2 0.61% 
Canada 1 0.31% 
Denmark 1 0.31% 
Norway 1 0.31% 
Portugal 1 0.31% 
Sweden 1 0.31% 
Uganda 1 0.31% 
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